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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [redacted]

SG1I Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

SUBJECT: Resources for Assessment of Foreign Developments
in Parapsychology

REFERENCE: Memo for DDI fm D/OSWR, dtd 28 August 95, Re DI
Work in Response to CDA on Parapsychology

1. Action Requested: Your concurrence on the following statement of need for resources in the DI for assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology.
2. Background on Stargate: At the direction of Congress, DIA's Stargate program, which focused on assessing the potential application of parapsychological phenomenon to intelligence, has been transferred to CIA. The DIA program and resources

[redacted] had three objectives:

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- a. Operations: Attempts to use the parapsychological technique of remote viewing to collect intelligence on foreign targets.
- b. Research and Development: Laboratory studies to find ways to enhance the utility of remote viewing for intelligence purposes.
- c. Foreign Assessment: The analysis of foreign activities related to the development or use of paranormal techniques that could affect US national security.

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3. Within CIA, the DS&T has been charged to respond to a CDA related to the Stargate program. The CDA asked for three things:

a. An assessment of the utility of remote viewing for US intelligence. This assessment is being conducted under the direction of ORD/DS&T.

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b. An assessment of Russian parapsychological R&D. The assessment of the Russian parapsychology program is being done by [redacted] now assigned at CIA who worked in the operations part of the Stargate program. I stated in my memo to you of 28 August the assessment is being done under the oversight of the SG1I NIO/S&T and [redacted] of OSWR.

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c. A management plan for the use of Stargate resources in CIA. The DS&T officer drafting the management plan [redacted] of ORD) has asked for an opinion from the NIO/S&T and OSWR regarding the need for resources for the assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology.

4. Based on OSWR's review of available data, I recommend the DI offer the following statement of need for the assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology:

Need for Assessment of Foreign Parapsychology R&D

A. We recommend that no DI resources be dedicated to the assessment of foreign developments in parapsychology. Among the areas of science and sociological change we are monitoring, we view developments in parapsychology as a relatively low threat to the United States and, consequently, as a low priority among all the threats we are trying to monitor and assess. The DI will, of course, continue to monitor all foreign scientific and sociological developments--including those in parapsychology--that could have implications for US national security.

B. The assessment of Russian parapsychology R&D done this month at Congressional direction provides evidence of on-going research, as well as military sponsorship of at least some of the work. In none of this Russian research do we see credible evidence of developments that could significantly add to the threat that Russia currently poses to US national security.

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C. A CIA assessment of 1977 showed that the Soviets at that time had a substantial parapsychology program whose existence was classified and whose funding and control resided largely with the Ministry of Defense and possibly the KGB. The government of the USSR, however, apparently was unable to reap any benefits of consequence from its substantial investment. Since the breakup of the USSR, the

Russian government evidently has cut back significantly its support for parapsychology R&D.

D. In our view, DI monitoring of foreign activities in parapsychology will be dramatically leveraged through coverage of the topic by Western academia. The decline in Russian government funding of R&D, along with the dramatic opening of Russian society to contact with foreigners, has led to increased communication between Russian and US parapsychology researchers. And, as we have observed in other areas of Russian R&D, Russian researchers in parapsychology have become quite open in discussing their work with foreigners. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the evidence--and all key evidence--of Russian work in parapsychology since 1991 comes from open sources (press and technical literature) and from US parapsychology researchers in contact with their Russian counterparts. A focused intelligence collection effort would probably generate additional information, but we believe the value of such an effort would be negligible.

5. If you have questions or comments on this statement, please do not hesitate to give me a call on

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CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

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SG1I OSWR/RD/ [REDACTED] (21 September 1995)

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